We give a logical framework for reasoning with observations at di erent time points. We call belief extrapolation the process of completing initial belief sets stemming from observations by assuming minimal change. We give a general semantic and we propose several extrapolation operators. We study some properties veri ed by these operators and investigate computational issues, including computational complexity. We study in detail the position of belief extrapolation with respect to revision and update ; in particular, we show that, although it deals with non-static worlds, belief extrapolation cannot be a belief update operator in the sense of Katsuno and Mendelzon; then, we show how to integrate update and extrapolation. Lastly, closely related lines of work are positioned with respect to belief extrapolation.
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between belief revision and update 12] is usually thought of this way: revision incorporates newly acquired beliefs about a static world while update modi es beliefs according to a change in the system, \noti ed" by an \input" formula ' . However, there is some ambiguity in the exact nature of the input formula ' . What does \a noti cation of the change" mean exactly? At least two distinct interpretations are possible: some time has passed between the initial time point t 0 when the initial belief state K was known to hold and a later time point t 1 when ' is observed (by means of a sensor, a request to a database, a noti cation by another agent, etc.); ' is the expected consequence of an action performed between t 0 and t 1 .
Failing to distinguish these types of information may lead to counterintuitive results, as seen on the following example:
We consider a system to diagnose, whose components may fail independently, which means that there is no prior causal link between the failure of a component and the failure of another one. To simplify the problem we assume that for a given component, the transition from the failure mode to the working mode is not more exceptional than the transition from the working mode to the failure mode 1 . Scenario 1: at t = 1, we know that exactly one of components a and b is faulty, and c works correctly: K = (faulty a faulty b)^:faulty c where denotes exclusive or. We wait for some time, and then (at t = 2), some new observations (coming for instance from tests) make us learn that component b is ok but c is not: ' = :faulty b^faulty c. Scenario 2: at t = 1, as for Scenario 1, K = (faulty a faulty b)^:faulty c. Then the action of repairing component b as well as the (unfortunate) action of breaking component c are performed. The effects of these two independent actions can be expressed by ' = :faulty b^faulty c. These two scenarios are di erent and must lead to different conclusions. In case of Scenario 1, the intuitive way of changing beliefs is: \since component b is ok and changes are exceptional, there are good reasons to believe that b was already ok at time 1, so component a was the faulty one and most expectedly still is; as to c that has just been oberved faulty, there is no am-biguity". Therefore, the belief state at time 2 should be faulty a^:faulty b^faulty c. The case of Scenario 2 is di erent: the e ect of repairing b does not bring any new information on its former state, nor, a fortiori, on the former state of a; the belief about a should thus remain unchanged and the belief state at t = 2 should be :faulty b^faulty c. Now, belief update may be the right thing to do for Scenario 2, but not for Scenario 1. The principle responsible to this inadequacy of belief update to handle Scenario 1 is the most \typical" property of belief update, namely U8 (see Section 5) which says that models of K should be updated independently; as a consequence, usual belief update operators satisfy K ' = :faulty b^faulty c; this is the expected result for Scenario 2 but not for Scenario 1 (where we expect faulty a^:faulty b^faulty c). From these two scenarios we may advance an hypothesis: belief update is not appropriate when the input is an observation. Two questions follow: (Q1) When is it appropriate? (Q2) How should we change a belief base to take account of observations occuring at different time points? As to Q1, Scenario 2 suggests that belief update works when the input is the expected result (or projection) of an action (or an event) whose occurrence is known to the agent. Q2 leads to de ning a di erent operator that we call belief extrapolation. This operator takes a sequence of observations assumed to hold for certain and projects these observations forwards and backwards, assuming that uents tend to persist throughout time. Such operators are not completely new (they have been considered in 3] and 17] { see the related work Section). The basic assumptions for extrapolation operators are the following two ones:
1. the agent can only observe some properties at some time points, but does not have the ability of performing actions; furthermore, if events occur, they are perceived by the agent through the observations only (for instance, the occurrence of the event that it will be raining tonight will be perceived by actually seeing the rain, or seeing the wet ground tomorrow morning, but not by listening to today's weather forecast). This is why changes can be quali ed as unpredicted. In Section 5, however, we show that it is possible to generalize extrapolation operators so as to handle actions as well, provided that they are distinguished from observations, in order to minimize only the uents not concerned by action a ects. 2. the system is inertial, which means that by default, the system remains in a static state. This assumption justi es the use of a change minimization policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give some background about revision and update. In Section 3 we formally de ne belief extrapolation; we propose several extrapolation operators and study their properties. In Section 4 we investigate computational issues, and propose a practical method for computing extrapolated beliefs for one of the formerly considered extrapolation operators. In Section 5 and 6, we study the connections between extrapolation and, respectively, revision (including iterated revision) and update. Note that there is no static trajectory satisfying .
De nition 3 (change set)
The change set Ch( ) of a trajectory is de ned by:
Ch( ) = hf; ti f 2 F; t 2 2::j j; (t ? 1) j= :f and (t) j= f We also de ne Ch( ; f) = ft j hf; ti 2 Ch( )g.
Example 1, continued
Ch( 0 ) = fh:a; 2i; hb; 3i; h:b; 5i;h:c; 5ig and Ch( 1 ) = fh:b; 4ig.
We see that 1 looks \more static" than 0 .
The input of an extrapolation operator is a consistent scenario . Formulas of are observations (coming from sensors, from communication with other agents etc.). For the sake of simplicity we do not consider static laws expressing dependence between uents; however, it is possible (though not optimal in practice) to give these static laws the status of observations: at each time point the initial belief will thus be the conjunction of the observation and the static laws. The consistency of means that observations are assumed to be reliable (see 10] for a discussion on this point).
PREFERRED TRAJECTORIES AND EXTRAPOLATION OPERATORS
Given an observation scenario , belief extrapolation consists in completing it using persistence assumptions (such a process is referred to as chronicle completion in 19] ). The rationale of belief extrapolation is that as long as nothing tells the contrary, uents do not change. So, our aim is to nd the best trajectories satisfying the observations, i.e., the most static trajectories. This is why we introduce preference relations on trajectories:
De nition 4 (preference relations on trajectories)
A preference relation is a re exive and transitive relation on TRAJ N (not necessarily connected Inertia says that if there exist static trajectories for a given scenario , then the set of preferred trajectories must be the set of all static trajectories for ; it means that if it can be consistently assumed that no change occured, then completion consists in jumping to this conclusion. The fact that a preference relation is change-based induces a simpli cation, because the relation is then easier to specify. Intuitive preference relations are most of the time change-based (and actually, almost all examples of preference relations given further on are changebased). Example of preference relation which are not change-based are complex relations where the context of the change is relevant (see further). We are now in position to formally de ne an extrapolation operator.
De nition 6 (extrapolation operators)
Any preference relation induces an extrapolation operator l : S ! S de ned by:
Mod( l (t)) = f (t) j 2 Min( ; Traj( ))g
SOME EXAMPLES OF PREFERENCE RELATIONS
We now give several examples of preference relations. The rst one just consists in minimizing the number of elementary changes throughout the process.
-number of changes: The three trajectories minimal for nc are:
trajectory Ch( ) 1 = hm2; m2; m2; m4; m4i fh:b; 4ig 2 = hm2; m2; m2; m6; m6i fh:a; 4ig 3 = hm2; m2; m6; m6; m6i fh:a; 3ig
Extrapolating w.r.t. nc gives: Note that we recover nc by letting k(f) = 1 for all f. A completely di erent type of minimization, which has been proposed in many places before, consists in delaying change as much as possible, e.g., preferring trajectories where change occur as late as possible. This policy is called chronological minimization in 20]; it is extensively discussed in 19].
-chronological : the preference relation achr is de ned recursively by 2 As proposed by a reviewer, it could appear more natural to allow no-cost changes, i.e., de ning k as a function from F to IN (instead of IN ). The reason why we impose that changes have a strictly positive penalty is to impose inertia for each uent. Non-inertial extrapolation would deserve another paper (see some comments in Conclusion). Ch( ) 4 = hm1; m5; m5; m5; m6i fh:a; 2i; h:c; 5ig 5 = hm1; m5; m5; m6; m6i fh:a; 2i; h:c; 4ig 6 = hm1; m5; m6; m6; m6i fh:a; 2i; h:c; 3ig
As to cseq , the minimal trajectories are 1 , 2 and 3 . Notice that 2 cseq 4 and that 4 cseq 5 cseq 6 .
Remark also that 7 = hm1; m1; m6; m6; m6i cannot be compared w.r.t. cseq to 5 and 6 : indeed, Ch( 7 ) = fh:a; 3i; h:c; 3ig, therefore, in 7 the changes from :a to a and from c to :c occur simultaneously, whereas for 4 , 5 and 6 , the changes from :a to a occurs before the change from c to :c. All these preference relations consider atomic changes as independent. It may be the case, however, that uents do not change independently from each other. This is the case when changes are caused by events as in 4]. A (deterministic) event " is a mapping from M to M, where "(m) is the result of event " when the initial state is m. The empty event " ; is the identity. Each event has a penalty k(") 0 with k(") = 0 if and only if " = " ; . Given a set of events E and two models m; m 0 , let k E (m; m 0 ) = minfk(") j " 2 E; m 0 = "(m)g (= +1 if no such sequence exists) and K E ( ) = P t=0::N?1 k E ( (t); (t+1)). We now de ne the eventbased preference relation:
event penalty E e 0 if and only if K E ( ) K E ( 0 )
This de nition can be re ned by assuming that several consecutive event occurences are possible between two time points. This leads us to de ne an event sequence as a combination of events = " 1 ::: " p , such that, (m) = " 1 (" 2 (:::(" p (m)))); we let k( ) = P i21::p k(" i ). Given a set of events E and two models m; m 0 , we now let k E (m; m 0 ) = min j (m)=m 0 k( ) (= +1 if no such sequence exists). K E ( ) and E e are then de ned as above. The events (or event sequences) minimizing k E (m; m 0 ) can be considered as the plausible explanations of the transition from m to m 0 .
Example 1 (continued)Let E = f" ; ; " 1 c; a^b^:c;:a^:b^:c; :a^:b^:ci, corresponding to the occurrence of event " 1 between t = 3 and t = 4. Note that since the e ects of events generally depend on the initial state, the data of Ch( ) and Ch( 0 ) are generally not enough to decide whether E e 0 , i.e., event-based preference relations are generally not change-based.
PROPERTIES
We start by giving a set of basic properties and then we show that under weak conditions, they are satis ed by extrapolation operators. Let be a consistent scenario and ', two propositional formulas. E1 says that observations are reliable. E4 says that extrapolation is monotonic when adding a new observation consistent with the extrapolation of the former observations; E4 and E6 together mean that taking account of this new observation consistent with l before or after extrapolation gives equivalent results. E5 means that if it can be consistently assumed that nothing changed, then this assumption is made, and therefore the extrapolated belief at each time point is the conjunction of all observations. Note that E1, E2 and E4 entail ll l, i.e., extrapolation is idempotent. Beyond these rather undebatable properties, there are other intuitive properties that extrapolation operators may be required to satisfy: E7 if ' j= or j= ' then 8t 6 = j j + 1; j j + 2, ( :': 0 )l (t) ( :')l (t) if t j j + 1 (': 0 )l (t ? j j) if t > j j + 1 Unlike properties E1-E6, which did not explicitely refer to the ow of time, E7-E8 express important properties related to persistence or independence of changes. E7 says that if an observation is followed or preceded by a stronger information, then the extrapolated beliefs on other time points would have been the same, had we got twice the stronger information instead. Importantly, this property considers persistence not only forward but also backward: if an observation holds at a given time point, then by default it holds afterwards as well as before. E8 means that an empty observation has no in uence on extrapolated beliefs. An extrapolation operator violating E8 is the (weird) operator based on s. This result has to be drawn together with the complexity of inference under the backwards semantics in 17] since both problems are closely related (see Section 6).
COMPUTING EXTRAPOLATED BELIEFS
For the rest of this Section we x the preference relation to csi . We de ne now a minimal explanation for as the change set Ch( ) of a csi -preferred trajectory of . and (ii) there is no ? 0 explaining minimally such that Cov(? 0 ) Cov(?). The set of mcmes for expresses minimal explanations in a compact way and is redundancy-free: indeed, it can be easily shown that for each minimal explanation for there is one and only one mcme ? for covering . In the previous example, there are two mcmes: fh:a; 2; 5i; h:b; 2; 3i;hb; 4; 7i;h:c;2; 8ig and fh:a; 2; 5i; h:b; 2; 3i;hb; 4; 7i;h:d;5;8ig. When observations are disjunction-free we easily get: Proposition 6 If for each t, (t) is a consistent conjunction of uents, then there is only one maximally compact minimal explanation for .
Compact minimal explanations can be computed by adding to a maximal set of persistence assumptions expressing that each uent f persists by default during intervals between two consecutive observations \rele-vant" to f. This notion of relevance is modeled in this simple way (see 14]): We say that an observation ' is relevant to a propositional variable v, denoted Rel('; f), if and only if there is no formula equivalent to ' in which v does not appear at all 4 . Now, for a variable v, let R (v) = ft 2 1::N s:t: Rel( (t); v)g; now, the set of relevant intervals RI (v) to v w.r.t. is de ned by RI (v) = f t; t 0 ] jt 2 R (v); t 0 2 R (v); t+1; t 0 ?1]\R (v) = ;g. The intuitive meaning of relevant intervals is that it is sound to consider only persistence assumptions regarding a given variable within these intervals only 5 . Variables are then time-stamped by the time point they refer to 6 fv t ! v t 0; :v t ! :v t 0g. De ne the P-explanations for hP ; i as the minimal subsets of P such that P n is consistent with . Each Pexplanation can be identi ed with a compact change set ?( ) in an obvious way; for instance, = fa 4 ! a 7 ; :c 5 ! :c 6 g draws ?( ) = fh:a; 5; 7i; hc; 6; 6ig, i.e., a became false once between 4 and 7 (i.e., at 5, 6, or 7) and c became true at 6. We have the following: This method could be further improved by distinguishing between positive and negative observations. 6 A similar translation in used in 11] so as to represent beliefs about di erent time point in a pure belief revision framework. 7 Note that it is not always the case that the compact exeach minimal explanation for is covered by exactly one P-explanation, i.e., there exists one and only one such that 2 ?( ).
Thus, a covering set of compact explanations can be computed using abduction algorithms. We also point that complexity results and tractable classes about logic-based abduction 9], can be used to evaluate the di culty of this task and nd some tractable subclasses of extrapolation.
EXTRAPOLATION AND REVISION
We do not recall here the well-known AGM postulates 1], which are anyway not crucial to the understanding of this Section. Belief revision usually deals with static worlds, and therefore works with formulas pertaining to the same time point. However, as remarked in 11], \what is important for revision is not that the world is static, but that the propositions used to describe the world are static". This explains why, when indexing propositional variables by time points as we do in the Section 3, we manage to capture a fully dynamic process within a pure belief revision framework: belief extrapolation is equivalent to revising the prior belief that all uents persist throughout time by the observations.
FROM EXTRAPOLATION TO REVISION
A rst connection appears when we consider sequences of two observations only. Extrapolation operators on sequences of length 2 are called 2-extrapolation operators. Since the language is nite, we consider revision operators as acting on propositional formulas as in 13] (and not on belief sets). From l: L 2 ! L 2 we induce the belief change operator ? = (l) : L 2 ! L 2 by KB ? = hKB; i l (2) . Conversely, from a belief change operator ? we induce the operator l= (?) by h (1); (2)i l (2) = (1) ? (2) and h (1); (2)i l (1) = (2) ? (1) . Note that, obviously, ( (?)) = ?, but ( (l) =l does not necessarily hold.
planations ? computed according to the previous method are maximally compact, as seen on the following example: = ha;c;a _ c; b; :a _ b; :ai yields the compact minimal explanations fh:a;4; 5ig and h:a;6;6ig which are not maximally compact since their union fha; 4; 6ig is a mcme. If we wish to obtain the mcmes for we have to de ne a compacti cation procedure whose precise description is outside the scope of the paper. This result sheds more light on what belief extrapolation intuitively consists of. Assuming c! connected and N = 2, the extrapolated belief set at time 2 consists of the revision of beliefs at time 1, which we believe to persist to time 2, by the observations at time 2 which hold for certain. This looks like a pure revision framework, but have in mind that the world is dynamic. Symmetrically, the extrapolated belief set at time 1 consists of the revision of beliefs at time 2, which we believe to \ persist backwards" to time 1, by the observations at time 1. Thus, we can draw an extrapolation operator from any revision operator. Actually, it can be shown that properties E1-E6 correspond to a reformulation of the AGM postulates so as to take account from di erent time points; however, they are only little relevant to the speci cities concerned with the ow of time, such as forms of Markovianity and independence of changes expressed by E7-E9. Therefore, as soon as we require other properties than the basic ones, extrapolation is \more speci c" than AGM revision.
FROM REVISION TO EXTRAPOLATION

EXTRAPOLATION AND ITERATED REVISION
Now, an interesting question is the possible connections between extrapolation and iterated belief revision. Especially, Lehmann's iterated revision 16] considers sequences of consistent formulas 8 , therefore the 8 Other approaches to iterated belief revision act on epistemic states rather than on sequences of formulas and the comparison with extrapolation is more complex to establish.
input On the other hand, I4 is generally not satis ed 9 and I7 is never satis ed. Thus, Lehmann is right when saying that for a belief change operator on a changing situation, \one would probably accept all the postulates ...] except I4 and I7 " 16] . The di erence between extrapolation and iterated revision is clear when considering the following example: let = ha ! b; a; :ai; any \reasonable" extrapolation operator satis es l= ha^b; a^b; :a^bi (the change from a to :a between 2 and 3 being certain, the preferred trajectory is the one containing no other changes). Now, Lehmann's iterated revision, and also most iterated revision operators de ned on epistemic states (e.g., 7] 2]) give a ! b; a; :a] = :a. The reason for this di erence is that iterated revision is concerned with pieces of information concerning a static world, therefore, once the new information :a has \cancelled" the preceding one, the reasons to believe in b have disappeared. This strong \directivity" of time in iterated revision contrasts with extrapolation, where past and future can often be interchanged (as soon as the property (R) is satis ed).
EXTRAPOLATION AND UPDATE
An update operator is a function which associates to a knowledge base K representing knowledge about a system in an initial state and a new piece of information ' (whose precise meaning is to be discussed further) a new knowledge base K ' representing the system after this evolution. As for revision, Katsuno and Mendelzon have proposed a set of postulates that an update operator should satisfy. The most \typi-cal" postulate is
which tells that models of K are updated indepen- 
EXTRAPOLATION IS NOT BELIEF UPDATE
When N = 2, belief extrapolation projected on time 2 can be rephrased this way: from a belief set K = (1) at time 1 and an observation = (2) at time 2, compute a completed belief set at time 2. This may look similar to belief update, however 2-extrapolation is not belief update. This is clear from point 1 of Proposition 8 (or from E5): it is known that the AGM postulates are inconsistent with postulate U8 12] as soon as the language contains at least two propositional symbols 10 :
Proposition 11 Assume that the language contains at least two propositional symbols. Let N = 2, l a 2-extrapolation operator, and ? the induced belief change operator as in Section 4. Then ? cannot satisfy U8.
Therefore, no belief change operator induced by a 2-extrapolation operator is a belief update operator.
This simple result has signi cant consequences. It means that for reasoning about time-stamped observations on a changing world, belief update is not adequate (see the example in Introduction). The key point is postulate U8 which, by requiring that all models of the initial belief set be updated separately, forbids us inferring new beliefs about the past from later observations. This inadequacy of update to handle observations is not new (see e.g. 4]), but is rarely mentioned in papers about belief update: indeed, saying that updating KB by comes down to incorporate observation (coming from sensors for instance) re ecting a change in the world is not correct. So, the impossibility (with update) to infer new beliefs at time 1 from the incorporated belief at time 2 means that we do not observe (from sensors, by communicating with other agents etc.) anything at time 2 11 . Therefore, if not an observation, the input is necessarily a prediction, more precisely, the projection of the expected e ects of some \explicit change", most likely, the expected (not the observed) e ect of an action. 10 More precisely, U8 cannot be satis ed together with the strong K?3 and K?4 in presence of the more harmless postulates K?2, K?5 and K? 6. 11 However, a second interpretation would be acceptable: there are observations at time 2 but they are completely unrelated to the world at time 1 (which implies giving up persistence assumptions and minimal change) and a belief change operator in this extreme case is not worth studying.
We see that the crucial issues are observability (what do we observe about the world at what time?) and predictability of change. Belief extrapolation deals with observation and unexpected change, while belief update is suitable for expected change without observation. In Sandewall's taxonomy 19], extrapolation is adequate for the action-free subclass of K-IS (correct knowledge, inertia and surprises) while update is adequate for the class K p -IA (no observations after the initial time, inertia and alternative results of actions).
INTEGRATING EXTRAPOLATION AND UPDATE
Extrapolation and update complete each other and in order to be able to reason both with implicit and explicit change, we can integrate both rather easily as follows. A mixed scenario now contains both observations and explicit updates (corresponding to expected e ects of actions) and is therefore a sequence of formulas labelled either by observe or by update, the rst member of the sequence being of the observe type. For instance, 0 = h observe: a _ b, update: :b, observe: :a i is a mixed scenario expressing that a _ b was rst observed, then an action was performed whose expected e ect is :b, and, after it, :a was observed. Let be an arbitrary update operator and a changebased preference relation induced by a relation c on change sets. Let be a mixed scenario of length N and = hM 0 ; :::; M N i a trajectory. We say that satis es with respect to if and only if (1) for every t such that (t) = observe: we have M t j= ; (2) for every t such that (t) = update: we have M t 2 M t?1 . Let Traj ( ) the set of trajectories satisfying w.r.t . Let UnprCh( ) the set of unpredicted changes of , i.e., the changes hf; ti 2 Ch( ) such that f is not involved in an update at time t.
is a preferred trajectory with respect to and if and only if there is no trajectory 0 2 Traj ( ) such that UnprCh( 0 ) c UnprCh( 0 ). Lastly, the operator m induced by and is de ned by Mod( m (t)) = f (t) j 2 Pref(Traj ( ))g. Therefore, preferred trajectories are selected in two steps: (1) lter out trajectories that do not satisfy all observations or all explicit changes; (2) among remaining trajectories, minimize unexpected change. Choosing any satisfying the KM postulates and any , the latter 0 yields 0 m= ha _ b; :b; :a^:bi. This integration of extrapolation and update can deal with observations and actions (deterministic or not). Three issues are not dealt with: All three issues could be dealt with by attaching degrees of surprise to misperceptions, event occurrences, action e ects and event e ects, and and then maximize the global level of surprise over the whole trajectory. This is a topic for further research.
RELATED WORK
In addition to the position of extrapolation with respect to revision, iterated revision, update and generalized update, already discussed in Sections 4 and 5, several works are related to belief extrapolation.
BERGER, LEHMANN AND
SCHLECHTA Berger et al. 3] propose a generic class of belief change operators which is actually a subclass of the set of extrapolation operators. More exactly, an extrapolation operator is a belief change operator as in 3] if and only if its preference relation satis es the following property (BLS). Let h( ) de ned from by h( )(1) = (1) and for k 1, h( )(k + 1) = (i k+1 ) where i k+1 is the smallest integer such that (i k+1 ) 6 = (i k ), if it exists; and so on until such an integer can no longer be found. The property (BLS) is then the following: for any trajectories , 0 such that there exists a sequence of integers 1 j 1 < j 2 < ::: < j k such that h( ) = hm 0 ; :::; m n i and h( 0 ) = hm j0 ; :::; m jk i, we have 0 . It can be shown that, among the preference relations we proposed, those that satifsy (BLS) are nc , ncf , ifc , cseq and k cp . While they do not study various preference relations on trajectories nor investigate computational issues, Berger et al. get a both-directions representation result; we have not got such a result yet for belief extrapolation (note that our operators being less constrained than theirs, the latter representation result does not apply to belief extrapolation).
6.2 LIBERATORE AND SCHAERF Liberatore and Schaerf 17] propose a fairly general system (BReLS) aiming at integrating revision, update and merging. It deals with time-stamped observations and consider two semantics; using the \trajec-tory" semantics and assuming that there is no more than one observation at each time point, we obtain our extrapolation operator induced by the penaltyinduced relation cp . The other semantics (\point-wise") yields iterated update (but is incompatible with extrapolation because of U8 which underlies this semantics); it seems that the authors did not consider mixing updates and observations by using both semantics simultanesouly as we brie y did in Section 5. On the other hand, BReLS provides an integrated treatment of both static and dynamic reasoning, and thus includes the possibility of reprsenting exceptional effects or misperceptions.
OTHER WORKS
Friedman and Halpern 11] de ne a very general framework for belief change, based on trajectories (or \runs") and in which the central process is that of conditioning. Like belief revision and update, it can be shown that extrapolation is an instance of their general framework. Largou et et Cordier 15] propose a (probabilistic) framework for belief change integrating observations and expectations allowing, like ours, to complete an initial scenario by persistence assumptions. Their completion process operates in two subsequent steps: beliefs are rst propagated forwards (from time 0 to time n) and then propagated backwards (from time N to time 0). Their process, by performing postdiction steps after prediction steps, give priority to backwards persistence and therefore almost never gives the same results as belief extrapolation. In an earlier work 8] we considered a probabilistic model of unpredicted change which may be seen as the probabilistic counterpart of the approach given here. A prior probability is attached to each elementary change and assuming prior independence between occurrences of elementary changes. The case where probabilities of change are in nitely small was particularly focused on.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed a general family of belief change operators which consist in completing initial observations by persistence assumptions. We have discussed in details the links between extrapolation and revision, and its di erences with belief update (and located both families of operators within Sandewall's taxonomy). Further directions of work include : applying belief extrapolation to temporal diagnosis; developing a full framework for reasoning about both predicted change (action e ects) and unpredicted change; generalize extrapolation to partially non-inertial systems where some uents have a speci c dynamics.
